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tion, generally works well, except for the case of very persistent technology 
shocks. However, exactly how costly is it for the Bank of Korea to deviate 
from the optimal policy rule? The numbers reported in table 8.6 seem to 
suggest that the cost might not be very large. I would like to see the authors 
discuss the economic signifi cance of the numbers reported in table 8.6, as 
well as their implications for monetary policy in practice.
Comment Mohamed Rizwan Habeeb Rahuman
Generally, this chapter is timely as it attempts to discern the reasons for 
the recent rise in oil prices and the macroeconomic impact it has on South 
Korea. The authors attribute the recent oil price shock (especially since 
2003) on demand conditions, which is distinct in character from previous oil 
price shocks that were mostly supply shocks. On this point, this discussant 
concurs fully with the authors, and indeed, it is clear that the authors were 
inspired by James Hamilton’s seminal works (Hamilton and Herrera 2004; 
Hamilton 2008, 2009) that lead to this conclusion as well.
However, I have some comments. The authors mention the inherent 
“battle” between headline infl ation and core infl ation in determining the 
function of oil shocks on the macroeconomy, especially in setting monetary 
policy. Though the chapter seems to lean toward Hamilton’s contention 
that oil price shocks, due to their increasingly permanent nature, cannot 
be treated as transitory and headline infl ation must be paid close attention 
by central banks, the authors shied away from making a clear argument. I 
believe a thorough discussion on this issue, and clearly stating which way the 
authors believe the direction should be taking, would not only strengthen 
the argument of demand- shock role of oil prices that this chapter wants to 
make, but also would serve to infl uence many central bankers in deciding 
the role of oil price shocks in setting monetary policy.
The authors inserted a clear “structural break” in the data set, separating 
the data set for the Korean economy between “pre- crisis” (which is 1970 to 
1997) and “post- crisis” (which is 2000 to 2009). The years 1998 and 1999 
were omitted, as the authors argued that these two years saw the Korean 
economy moving to a free- fl oating exchange rate system, and adopting an 
infl ation- targeting regime. I believe this structural break could have led to a 
fl awed data set, as the years 1998 and 1999, the years of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, also led to a sharp decline in oil prices (hitting the trough of US$10 
per barrel in September 1998) due to negative demand shock from East 
Asia. Just as the authors intend to investigate the positive demand shock 
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on oil prices on the Korean economy, the data set must include the negative 
demand shock on oil prices on the Korean economy experienced in those two 
years. This critical omission will, in the discussant’s humble opinion, aﬀect 
the conclusions of this chapter. I suggest the inclusion of the 1998 to 1999 
data, with perhaps a dummy variable introduced to address the author’s 
concerns on the changes in the Korean economy during the time period.
This chapter makes an extraordinary fi nding that the eﬀect of the demand-
 led oil price increase post- crisis on GDP and infl ation has been far more 
muted than the pre- crisis oil price increase. In other words, in pre- crisis, the 
oil prices and GDP growth were negatively correlated, while in the post-
 crisis, the eﬀect of oil price on GDP growth is almost fl at. To discover such 
conclusions in an oil- importing country such as Korea is surprising, and 
yet supports the discussant’s view that oil price movements are increasingly 
demand- led and relate to economic growth much more strongly than in the 
1970s and 1980s.
The chapter argues that if  monetary policy (MP) behaves in an anti-
 infl ationary manner toward rises in oil prices, especially if  it is demand-
 shock driven, the resultant decline in oil price infl ation would be matched (or 
overriden, even) by higher output gap volatility, aﬀecting GDP growth. If  
MP is accomodative however, the opposite is true. I agree with the fi ndings, 
but I wonder what the authors would have recommended a central bank to 
do, depending on the MP methodology. Again, the authors shied away from 
taking a stand on this issue, which considerably weakens their argument.
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